In that order, that's the decision with 1 the FCC determined that ISP-bound traffic was interstate in nature, and that was in--and again, 3 that was an order that was issued in February of 5 1999. 6 My question is, do you recall whether 7 there was any contract language, Interconnection Agreement language, between AT&T and Verizon that 9 may have implemented that order? 10 MR. PITTERLE: No, I'm not aware. 11∥not working with AT&T negotiations at that time, or 12 have not been since. 13 So, you do not know whether MR. McRAE: 14 there is any--there were any contract amendments on 15 | that point? 16 MR. PITTERLE: I do not. 17 MR. McRAE: Would you agree, subject to

MR. OATES: I object. That's been asked and answered. He doesn't know.

check, that there was no contract implementation

language that was negotiated on that point?

MR. McRAE: I'm just asking, subject to

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MR. PITTERLE: First of all, I'm not the AT&T negotiator, so I would have to go back and be--something that my attorney would be willing to offer. But I'm not involved in those negotiations, and really would be going to a bunch of people to try to figure out what happened.

MR. McRAE: Okay. Thank you. That's all I have.

MR. DYGERT: Mr. McRae, is that all the questioning you have for Mr. Pitterle on the entire intercarrier compensation panel?

MR. McRAE: We are trying to figure out how we are going to address the rest of the questions. AT&T may still have some additional questions, if we could have just a moment.

> MR. DYGERT: Okay.

MS. SCHMIDT: If it would be acceptable, I would prefer that Mr. Harrington proceed with his 20 questions, and--for both of the issues, the ISP issue and the virtual NXX issue, and AT&T would finish up with some questions on the FX issue after

1 Mr. Harrington has completed his cross. 2 MR. DYGERT: All right. 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION MR. HARRINGTON: Good afternoon. 4 5 MR. PITTERLE: Good afternoon. 6 MR. HARRINGTON: I would like to start 7 with the audit provision proposed by Verizon for 8 reciprocal compensation or ISP-bound traffic, and that is Section 5.7.8 on my copy of the JDPL that appears on page 34. I'm noticing people's page 11 numbers seem to vary a little bit. 12 MR. PITTERLE: I have it blank in my page. 13 MR. HARRINGTON: Can you find it in your 14 JDPL? 15 MR. PITTERLE: Are you referring to the 16 amendment? 17 MR. HARRINGTON: No, I'm referring to the 18 Verizon proposal. 19 MR. PITTERLE: Okay. Let me try again. 20 Page 34?

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MR. HARRINGTON: On mine.

MR. PITTERLE:

And the paragraph?

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1	MR. HARRINGTON: 5.7.8.
2	MS. PREISS: It's on the bottom of page 33
3	of mine, if it helps.
4	MR. PITTERLE: Thank you. That worked for
5	me, too.
6	MR. HARRINGTON: It appears that our
7	printers are somewhat different than everyone
8	else's.
9	Under this provision, which parties have
10	the right to an audit?
11	MR. PITTERLE: Verizon.
12	MR. HARRINGTON: So Cox doesn't, under
13	this provision?
14	MR. PITTERLE: It does not appear that way
15	to me.
16	MR. HARRINGTON: Can you conceive of a
17	circumstance under which Cox might wish to conduct
18	an audit under this provision?
19	MR. PITTERLE: I'm sure that's possible,
20	yes.
21	MR. HARRINGTON: For instance, if Cox were
22	concerned that Verizon were characterizing too much

1 traffic as transit traffic or underreporting in
2 some way the amount of traffic that was otherwise
3 subject to reciprocal compensation, couldn't that
4 trigger a Cox interest in doing an audit?

MR. PITTERLE: I'm certain that Cox would feel they have that right, yes.

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MR. HARRINGTON: But the provision doesn't give it, does it?

MR. PITTERLE: No, I'm sure if this was accepted by Cox and they wanted to apply that, they might try to find it somewhere else, such as in reservation-of-rights language or something. But to answer your question directly, it's not in here.

MR. HARRINGTON: As it happens, there is another audit provision, and I would like to turn to that. I have distributed a page that contains Section 5.7.5. I will note that the same language is also included in Verizon's proposal page 32 for most of you in the JDPL.

MR. PITTERLE: Excuse me, this is the current contract that Verizon has with--

MR. HARRINGTON: This is the proposed

contract.

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And as I discussed earlier, the language that appears in regular text is language that has been agreed to between the parties.

> MR. PITTERLE: Okay.

MR. HARRINGTON: As I just said a moment ago, this particular language is identical to Verizon's proposal contained in the JDPL as well, so I don't think there is any question that this is language that Verizon has accepted.

> MR. PITTERLE: That's fine.

MR. HARRINGTON: Is there anything in 5.7.5 that would prevent Verizon from conducting the kinds of audits that it would be able to 15 conduct under 5.7.8?

MR. PITTERLE: I would say this is 17 | focusing primarily on audit rights for rates, and the language you had pointed me to earlier was dealing with traffic billed as reciprocal compensation traffic to determine whether such 21 | traffic is reciprocal compensation and thus eligible for reciprocal compensation.

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So, I would think that this is an additional -- this being paragraph 5.7.8 in the JDPL you referred me to is really an additional aspect above and beyond the language of the audit responsibilities under 5.7.5.

MR. HARRINGTON: Do you see the language in the second line of 5.7.5 that refers to the audits being conducted to ensure that rates are being applied appropriately?

MR. PITTERLE: Yes, I do.

MR. HARRINGTON: And am I understanding your testimony to be that you don't believe this language would be sufficient to allow Verizon to determine whether the reciprocal compensation rate should be applied or the Internet-bound traffic 16 rate should be applied?

MR. PITTERLE: I do believe that we do not feel it would be sufficient.

19 MS. PREISS: Would you speak up a little 20 bit? We are having trouble hearing you.

MR. PITTERLE: I said I do believe--I would like you to ask me the question again,

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MR. HARRINGTON: Sure.

Looking at the language that says that in $4 \parallel 5.7.5$ the agreed-to provision that says that each 5 | party may conduct audits to ensure that rates are 6∥being applied appropriately, is it Verizon's 7 position that that language does not permit Verizon 8 to conduct an audit to determine whether the 9 reciprocal compensation rate or some other rate 10 should apply to traffic?

MR. PITTERLE: I believe what paragraph $12 \parallel 5.7.8$ in the JDPL is trying to do is give audit 13 | rights to look at the data that goes into traffic 14 | factor development and whether it's sufficient for 15 traffic factors, and not whether the rates are 16 accurate or whether they're being properly applied. So, I view this as an additional item or additional focus point that's new because of the ISP order in 19 the three-to-one provisions.

MR. HARRINGTON: In other words, the language in 5.7.8 that says that Verizon may conduct audits of the traffic billed as reciprocal

1 compensation traffic to determine whether such 2 traffic is reciprocal compensation traffic and 3 therefore subject to reciprocal compensation, in 4 | your view, has nothing to do with the correct rates 5 to be applied to that traffic?

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MR. PITTERLE: Well, it says beyond that, if any such traffic is determined not to be 8 reciprocal compensation traffic, we should not pay 9 reciprocal compensation for that portion. 10 could include traffic above three-to-one, it's 11 above the cap--that is, ISP-bound traffic that has 12 | zero additional compensation -- or could be at the 13 FCC capped rate.

MR. HARRINGTON: Oh, okay. So, the 15 decision about whether it's reciprocal compensation 16 traffic and subject to the reciprocal compensation 17 rate and whether it's above the cap as a 18 | for-instance and subject to zero is not a rate 19 decision?

That part of it is a rate MR. PITTERLE: 21 decision, but the data, the traffic data, to compare for the three-to-one factor is not

1 rate-specific.

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MR. HARRINGTON: I would like you to look at 5.7.5, the last sentence, and please read it out 4 loud.

MR. PITTERLE: (Reading) Each party agrees 6 to provide the necessary traffic data in conjunction with any such audit in a timely manner.

MR. HARRINGTON: So, under the 5.7.5, you could get any traffic data you need to conduct the 10 audit and see if the correct rates are being applied to particular traffic; isn't that correct?

MR. PITTERLE: I believe what Verizon was trying to do in its 5.7.8 was to ensure that it had the ability to get the proper data as it related to the new three-to-one factor, and that's why it added that paragraph, and felt that this was more traditional language dealing with whether traffic is being billed properly as accessed traffic or 19 local traffic or whether there was more minutes involved in that transaction than not. 20

I think that was the intent. Now, we may not have an agreement on that point, but I'm trying

to explain the intent.

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To answer your question directly, does that Section 5.7.5 properly take care of that? 4∥It's an interpretation, and apparently Verizon, 5 | inserting this language, its interpretation was that it didn't go far enough.

MR. HARRINGTON: What language would you 8 add to 5.7.5 to make it go far enough?

MR. PITTERLE: I would be hesitant 10 | without -- usually what I do when I propose language, 11 run it past my attorneys. I think that's something 12 | we could do as part of a negotiation process that 13 we do, and be willing to look into those types of 14 possibilities.

MR. HARRINGTON: One more question about 16 the audits.

Under the Commission's rules as adopted in 18∥that order--actually, there will be two more 19 | questions -- doesn't Verizon have the right to go to 20 the state if it thinks that there is a problem with 21 the traffic, regardless of any audit provision in 22 any contract?

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MR. PITTERLE: I believe Verizon does have 2 that right, yes.

MR. HARRINGTON: I would like to move to 4 the Verizon contention that the order is 5 | self-effectuating. I will start with a guestion 6 | actually relating to the audit provision, which is 7 why I said I had the second question.

If, in fact, the order is self-effectuating, why does Verizon need a separate 10 audit provision?

MR. PITTERLE: I'm not familiar with every 12 paragraph of the FCC order to answer that, but the 13 FCC order may or may not have sufficient language in it, from Verizon's perspective, to deal with that audit provision, along the terms that I 16 explained.

MR. HARRINGTON: All right. Now, are you aware generally of the conflicts over the last four and a half years concerning compensation for 20 ISP-bound traffic?

21 MR. PITTERLE: I have been aware of that 22 over the last--I don't think it's been four and a

1 | half years from my standpoint. A certain period of 2 time.

MR. HARRINGTON: I thought you might be.

Is it your experience that Verizon and CLECs tend to agree or disagree on these issues?

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MR. PITTERLE: Some CLECs we seem to be able to reach agreement, and with others we don't.

MR. HARRINGTON: Is it fair to say that when disagreements have occurred, they have been 10 substantial?

> MR. PITTERLE: In what terms?

12 MR. HARRINGTON: They take a long time to 13 resolve, if they get resolved at all.

MR. PITTERLE: Usually, what I have seen 15 in my experience is that the CLECs that disagreed 16 with us exercise the same rights you asked me about 17 earlier and go to the Commission, and the 18 Commission acts within its specific time frame. 19 they failed to take advantage of those rights, then 20 it could drag on.

MR. HARRINGTON: Are you aware that Cox 22 had to file a complaint against Verizon in Virginia

1 to enforce its reciprocal compensation rates under 2 its current agreement?

MR. PITTERLE: Vaguely, yes, I'm somewhat 4 aware.

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In that context, wouldn't MR. HARRINGTON: 6∥it make sense to detail the reciprocal compensation 7 | provisions and the ISP-bound traffic provisions as 8∥much as you can so as to minimize the amount of 9 controversy?

MR. PITTERLE: I'm not opposed to 11 minimizing controversy. Sitting up here right now, 12 that would seem like a great idea. But I do think 13 | that you can create controversy by trying to 14 minimize controversy. And as experienced in the 15 cross-examination earlier this morning, I think 16 | it's become evident that controversy can be 17 created, and even in trying to, in maybe good 18 intentions, to prevent future disputes.

I think what's more effective is to look 20 at the details, the finite details, and get the 21 proper people together that deal with those day in 22 and day out, and try to work out solutions.

1 | Verizon is not opposed to that. It's a negotiation 2 responsibility. And under that view, you can get 3 those issues resolved that way versus what we 4 experienced here this morning with various parts of 5 the proposals not being in line with the order.

MR. HARRINGTON: Are you saying that that 7 process has worked well so far for reciprocal 8 compensation?

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I think we are in a new MR. PITTERLE: 10 | environment for reciprocal compensation right now 11 under the ISP order.

12 MR. HARRINGTON: In the old order, did it 13 work well?

MR. PITTERLE: I can refer to one specific 15 thing in the old environment that didn't work well, 16 and that was because the technology had not 17 developed yet, and that is the entire Internet 18 traffic issue when the 1996 contracts were 19 | negotiated. So, there was no detail that could 20 have been put in the contract at that point because 21 | I don't think any of the parties anticipated what 22 the Internet was going to become.

1 MR. HARRINGTON: But when you know a detail you can put in, it's a good idea to do so, isn't it? 3 MR. PITTERLE: You could put in detail 4 that is consistent with applicable law. That's a 6 good idea. 7 MR. HARRINGTON: Great. Let's move on to some of those details. 9 You got in front of you copies of some 10 excerpts of the Commission's April 27th order. you pull those out, please. 11 12 MR. PITTERLE: I have them. 13 MR. HARRINGTON: I would like you to take $14 \parallel a$ look at paragraph 78, which is on page 37 of that 15 order.

I will note for the record that this is 17 not the official FCC version of the order, but I 18 believe the text is accurate.

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In the first three sentences of that paragraph, certain rate terms are described. those rate caps, or are those rates?

> MR. PITTERLE: They could be both.

MR. HARRINGTON: Did the Commission define 1 2 them as rate caps or as rates?

MR. PITTERLE: The word "capped" is used here, and I'm not trying to be elusive, but I think my point is that a cap could be used.

MR. HARRINGTON: That would be the maximum rate permitted?

MR. PITTERLE: Yes.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Any other rate beneath it would also be permitted?

MR. PITTERLE: I believe that the FCC order has specified that if a specific state had a previous decision prior to the effective date of this order that set a rate below the cap, then Verizon could decide whether they wanted to select 16 that lower rate or the cap.

MR. HARRINGTON: Has Virginia issued such 18 an order?

19 MR. PITTERLE: I'm not aware of any such 20 order.

MR. HARRINGTON: Now, I would like to 22 point you to a specific part of Verizon's contract

language, but unfortunately I'm unable to.

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Is there some place in Verizon's contract language where it specifies specific rates to be applied to this traffic? I have not been able to find it. That's why I'm asking.

MR. PITTERLE: I would say it's in reference back to the specific -- the references to the specific parts of the FCC order, to answer your question.

MR. HARRINGTON: I would like you to turn to paragraph 5.7.7, which happens to be before 5.7.8, which would be in the same page of the JDPL. 12

> MR. PITTERLE: Okay.

MR. HARRINGTON: Is this the only rate 15 term that appears in Verizon's proposed contract 16 | language? And I will read for you the sentence I'm 17∥referring to, (reading) Notwithstanding any other 18 provision of this agreement or any tariff, a party 19∥shall not be obligated to pay any intercarrier 20 compensation for Internet traffic that is in excess 21 of the intercarrier compensation for Internet 22 traffic that such party is required to pay under

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1 the FCC Internet order and other applicable FCC 2 orders and FCC regulations.

I guess I should note that this language has been modified to substitute the term "measured Internet traffic" for "Internet traffic."

MR. PITTERLE: Are you reading from --

MR. HARRINGTON: 5.7.7 from Verizon's 8 proposed language.

Is there any other place in the Verizon 10 proposed language where it talks at all about the 11 | rates that would be charged for this traffic?

> MR. PITTERLE: Yes, I believe there is.

13 MR. HARRINGTON: Could you show me where that is.

15 MR. PITTERLE: Turn to my page 31 of the 16 JDPL, but it's paragraph 5.7.4.

MR. HARRINGTON: Yes.

MR. PITTERLE: That would be another 19 section that I believe points to the sections of 20 the contract of the -- of the ISP order, excuse me, that you found the rates or caps.

MR. HARRINGTON: But that's all the

1 contract language does. It points to the FCC order?

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MR. PITTERLE: Yes. In this section it points to the order, and in Verizon's view that is its position on what rates would be applicable to 6 | ISP-bound traffic.

MR. HARRINGTON: So, Verizon's position is that the rate should be the cap?

MR. PITTERLE: Verizon would exercise its 10 | right, as the ISP order says, in any state that has 11 an order that sets something below the cap, Verizon 12 would reserve its rights to select that rate versus 13 the cap. If there is no such rate, Verizon has 14 another choice: They could select the cap or they 15 could refuse or not offer to exchange traffic that 16 terminates on it under 251(b)(5) traffic at that same rate, and then they would pay a higher rate or maybe a lower rate, but it's the reciprocal compensation rate. It's Internet traffic.

MR. HARRINGTON: Let's talk about Virginia and this agreement for a moment.

In Virginia, we already established that

there is no lower rate charged under Virginia law; correct?

There is no ruling in MR. PITTERLE: Virginia that set a rate for Internet traffic in 5 Virginia that I'm aware of.

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MR. HARRINGTON: You're not aware of any such proceeding to set such a rate?

> MR. PITTERLE: No, I'm not.

MR. HARRINGTON: Okay. So, we would be 10 referring back to the FCC order which sets a cap and doesn't set a rate in Virginia right now.

And is it Verizon's position right now that in Virginia the rate would be the maximum under the cap? Assuming you elected to apply all these things which we will get to in a moment.

MR. PITTERLE: I'm going to answer that by saying the only options I'm aware of Verizon in that situation that Verizon has is to select the cap rate for traffic above three-to-one within Verizon's local calling area, or to--and in doing so it has to offer to exchange traffic that terminates on it at the same rate which I believe

1 Verizon has done May 14th. Or it could--and if it refuses to do that offer or to offer to exchange traffic, then it would be accepting, I quess, the reciprocal compensation rates to traffic above three.

Of those two choices, I believe the former choice is to take the cap. I'm not certain of that.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Now, if you're incorrect that Verizon's only choice was to take them--the capped rate under the order, then you need to specify a rate in this contract or the parties would have to at some point negotiate a rate; correct?

MR. PITTERLE: Verizon has made the decision, which I said I believe it has, but I qualified I'm not certain, to use the cap. that is the rate that Verizon believes is in effect.

MR. HARRINGTON: Can you please direct him $21\|$ to actually answer the question I asked here. This is about the fourth time he's decided to go on some

1 other route.

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2 MR. OATES: I object to that 3 characterization of his testimony. I think 4 Mr. Pitterle has answered the questions directly 5 and honestly.

MR. HARRINGTON: Could I ask the question 7∥be read back and have him respond with a yes or no to it at least?

MR. DYGERT: All right, let's do that.

10 (Whereupon, the Court Reporter read back the previous question.)

MR. PITTERLE: I accept that with a yes.

MR. HARRINGTON: Thank you.

Moving on to the other topic, which is 15 | Verizon's election whether or not to use these 16 rates, in fact, the contract language you're 17 proposing constitutes that election as to Cox; is 18∥that right? You elected to take these rates by 19 proposing the contract language, or represents your 20 intent to take these rates.

21 MR. PITTERLE: It would seem to do that, 22 | yes.

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1 MR. HARRINGTON: So, that's really not an 2∥issue here?

MR. PITTERLE: These rates being the current .0015 rate for traffic above three-to-one? 5 Yes.

MR. HARRINGTON: Let's go back to the 7 ISP-bound traffic order and look at paragraph 79. 8 This is the paragraph that adopts the three-to-one 9 ratio.

Is there anything in this paragraph that 11 specifies how you calculate the three-to-one ratio, 12 decide what traffic falls within traffic you would use for it and what traffic you would not use?

> MR. PITTERLE: No.

MR. HARRINGTON: Is there somewhere else 16 | in the order that does, to your knowledge?

> MR. PITTERLE: Not to my knowledge.

MR. HARRINGTON: Is it therefore a 19 reasonable thing to do to include in your contract language that does explain how you will calculate 21 the three-to-one ratio?

MR. PITTERLE: At some point I think

1 that's reasonable, and I would like to explain, if 2 that's okay. I don't want to be accused of avoiding the answer on this one.

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I think there is a time in a learning experience that's needed under this order to get 6 | those things done, and Verizon is willing, as I 7 said in my--both parts of my testimony to sit down 8 and negotiate detailed terms with the parties to 9 help implement the order. That is in my testimony, 10 and Verizon is willing to do that, and it's our 11 requirement.

That said, we need to make sure that those 13 terms do not go beyond the order, do not interpret the order, do not become paraphrases of the order. 15 And with that in mind, Verizon just wants to be 16 very careful we don't create a whole new set of dispute potential issues by rushing to language in 18 the order immediately.

What I would suggest, which has been done 20||before, is that parties work together at the business level to try to resolve these issues, and 22 as agreements are reached that really pin these

areas down in more detail such as exactly what 1 minutes are used to calculate the three-to-one ratio, that that can be brought into the contract, 3 and Verizon is willing to bring that into the contract. We are not avoiding going any further in 5 the contract with detail. It's not been the proposal per se, but those details need to be more 8 readily resolved by the business parties. They can even be included in business rules, which is a very 10 common practice in the industry in many areas to resolve issues like this. They don't have to be in 12 the contract.

I would also like to state that the contract Verizon has with Cox may be viewed to be 15 different from AT&T's perspective or something they 16 want different. WorldCom may feel differently on 17 the terms. We have hundreds of CLECs that we are dealing with, and we could end up with 50 or 60 19 versions of this that we would suddenly have to implement either manually or within our business systems.

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So, what we would want to do is to come in

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with uniform, acceptable set of parameters on how to calculate these numbers -- that is, as

3 industry-wide as possible -- to benefit both parties.

MR. HARRINGTON: You have not made such a proposal to Cox at this time, have you?

MR. PITTERLE: I believe that we are working at the business level with some of the Whether that includes Cox, I don't know. carriers.

MR. HARRINGTON: Have you made a proposal to AT&T and WorldCom?

MR. PITTERLE: I know we had discussions 12 with AT&T and possibly WorldCom. I'm not involved in those on a day-to-day basis, so I can't say I have been personally involved, but I do know that the people that do that type of thing are in conversation with various CLECs on that issue.

MR. HARRINGTON: This order was issued April 27th. How long ago was that?

MR. OATES: Objection.

MR. HARRINGTON: I'm sorry, I will ask again.

It's been five months since the order was

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1 lissued. Isn't it surprising that you haven't 2 gotten a proposal out to the CLEC community that presumably, including Cox, that they could look at 4 | in that time since the three-to-one ratio was effective as of the effective date the order?

MR. PITTERLE: First of all, the effective date of the order was June 14th, but it was issued 8 April 27th. That is three and a half months of 9 elapsed time, and I believe Verizon is trying to 10 find ways. And as I said, I have been aware of 11 discussion with CLECs to try to find ways to agree 12 on various issues as to how to calculate 13 three-to-one. But I'm not sure that those have all 14 been resolved yet, and I'm not sure if it includes 15 Cox.

MR. HARRINGTON: Let me ask this a little differently: You knew on April 27th what the order said. And as you point out, the order went in effect June 14th at which point the three-to-one 20 ratio became an irrelevant point.

Isn't it unusual that you have been implementing the three-to-one ratio and have not

1 | had any discussions with anyone about how it should 2 be implemented.

3 MR. PITTERLE: I'm not sure whether we 4 have or not.

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MR. HARRINGTON: In connection with that, 6 has Verizon unilaterally reduced the amounts it's paying to CLECs based upon the April 27th order, even when they have existing contracts that have 9 not been replaced by new ones?

10 MR. PITTERLE: I'm sorry? Could you 11 repeat that?

MR. HARRINGTON: Has Verizon reduced the 13 | rates that it's paying pays to CLECs for reciprocal compensation based on the April 27th order and its 15 own interpretation of the three-to-one ratio/

MR. OATES: Could I ask for a 17 clarification of the question? Was the question 18 related to the CLECs that are involved in this 19 proceeding?

MR. HARRINGTON: Particularly as to Cox I could ask that question, if you would like.

I could start again --

MR. PITTERLE: I need to understand that 2 question a little better when you say "reduced its rate."

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MR. HARRINGTON: Since the effective date of this order, has Verizon taken any action as to Cox or any other CLEC in Virginia in which it has, without consultation with the CLEC, reduced amounts that was paying for reciprocal compensation, based 9 upon the April 27th order?

MR. OATES: I will object to the question on the grounds of relevance. First, whatever Verizon has done with other CLECs in Virginia would 13 not be relevant to this proceeding.

Second of all, the purpose of this proceeding is to derive language for a contract going forward. If Mr. Harrington or his client has a dispute about something that has occurred prior to this date, that's resolvable under the old contract, under whatever the appropriate dispute 20 resolution procedure is.

MR. HARRINGTON: The relevance is that to 22 the extent that Verizon has internally come up with

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about it.

a way of calculating whether you have reached the three-to-one ratio and growth caps and all those things and not shared it with any other party, 3 demonstrates they were able to coming up with something but they have not chosen to tell anyone

MS. PREISS: I think it's relevant. The witness could answer the question.

MR. PITTERLE: As I already testified, I'm 10 not sure what communication between the companies 11 has been precisely taking place on detailed issues. If there hasn't been a communication with a certainly CLEC, I think what I also said and testified to, Verizon is willing to meet with those 15 parties.

Could we get an answer to the MS. PREISS: 17 | question I think was asked. Since April 27th, has |Verizon--and I will ask the question with respect to Cox first--reduced its compensation payments to Cox to reflect the three-to-one ratio adopted in the Commission's order?

> MR. PITTERLE: I'm not certain if it has

or not.

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MS. PREISS: That would be under Cox's existing agreement with Verizon, not the one that's being arbitrated here. You don't know whether or not Verizon has reduced the rate of payment for intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic?

MR. PITTERLE: No, I do not.

MS. PREISS: Do you know the answer with respect to AT&T or WorldCom?

MR. PITTERLE: No. I haven't gotten into any of the specifics of what we are doing directly with carriers on an individual carrier basis, but as a general we are talking to carriers is my impression in the visit ahead with one of our staff people.

MS. PREISS: Do you know if it's Verizon's policy to reduce payments to carriers under existing contracts to reflect the three-to-one ratio in Virginia to reflect the three-to-one ratio in the ISP order?

MR. PITTERLE: It's an issue of 22 interpretation of existing contracts, I would

1 imagine, but I'm not directly familiar with whether it has been or not.

MS. FARROBA: So, you don't know whether any of the compensation has been changed, whether Verizon has changed any compensation rates after the date of the Remand Order?

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MR. PITTERLE: I don't know for sure. Ιt may have, it may not have. I don't know.

MS. PREISS: Could we ask Verizon to 10 provide that information to us, please.

RECORD REQUEST

MR. OATES: With respect to the parties in 13 this proceeding?

MS. PREISS: Yes, please, and any other CLEC in Virginia.

It seems to me it goes to--what we are trying to do here is implement--issue I-5 has to do 18 with implementing the Commission's ISP Remand 19 Order. If Verizon has taken actions to implement 20 that order in Virginia, pursuant to its contractual 21 relations with CLECs, I think that's relevant to 22 this issue.

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MR. OATES: We will certainly look into that.

MR. HARRINGTON: Going back to the order, are you aware of any provision of the order that addresses whether the compensation should be the 6 same for tandem and end-office interconnection?

MR. PITTERLE: To be honest, I'm not sure where the order goes on that issue. It's not an issue I focused on personally.

MR. HARRINGTON: Do you believe that would be relevant to figuring out what the parties should be paying each other?

MR. OATES: I would object to the question, that we served or we had a witness here yesterday on the question of end office versus tandem rates, indicated that was Mr. D'Amico who was the subject matter expert in that particular area.

MR. HARRINGTON: I think this is clearly 20 relevant to this particular topic and is not end office, whether the appropriateness -- it's not about the appropriateness of a particular choice.

about whether you should make a choice.

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MS. PREISS: I think this question doesn't go to rule 51.7.11.8.3 or whatever that rule was that Mr. D'Amico was testifying about yesterday. think this has to do with the applicability of the rates in the ISP order, which are different from reciprocal compensation rates under 251(b)(5). don't know if the witness can answer the question, 9 but he should if he's able.

MR. PITTERLE: The way I would answer it is to say if we are dealing with the Internet-bound traffic, the ISP compensation rates, assuming they're .0015, that is a rate that does not reflect in tandem or end office. It's consistent or uniform, no matter where the traffic is handed off.

MR. HARRINGTON: And Verizon would be comfortable with contract language to that effect?

When you say "to that MR. PITTERLE: effect, " could you describe what --

MR. HARRINGTON: Contract language consistent with your answer to the previous question.

MR. PITTERLE: I'm a negotiator, so I don't quickly agree to language changes in the contract without knowing what the specific language is, and I apologize for that type of approach, but it's a natural tendency when you say "to that effect."

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MR. HARRINGTON: But you just testified that it's Verizon's opinion that there was no distinction between tandem and-end office interconnection for the purpose of setting this compensation; correct?

MR. PITTERLE: I believe that's an interpretation of the order for myself, personally, yes.

MR. HARRINGTON: Personally or as a 16 representative of Verizon?

MR. PITTERLE: As a representative of Verizon.

MR. HARRINGTON: To that extent, Verizon 20 would be comfortable with the language that indicated the rate would be the same, regardless of whether it would be the tandem or end-office

1 | interconnection?

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MR. PITTERLE: We would be willing to 3 discuss that, yes.

MR. HARRINGTON: I would like to move on 5 to the use of the term "information access," which 6 was discussed previously during the petitioner's panel.

Can you explain to me what Verizon's position is on what traffic is included within the 10 term "information access" for the purpose of this contract?

MR. PITTERLE: My primary definition of 13 information access traffic is traffic under 251(g), as the ISP order indicates, and it would be 15 traffic related to ISP providers.

MR. HARRINGTON: Recognizing that I'm not 17∥asking you to give legal opinions here, is it your view that the only traffic that falls under 251(q) 19∥is the traffic that was described in the April 27th order, or is there other traffic that falls under 251(q)?

MR. PITTERLE: My belief is that it is

1 traffic that goes to Internet Service Providers.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Now, going back to the earlier testimony, are you saying, then, that to pick the example used at the time, time and temperature numbers would not fall within information access, or calls to those numbers would not fall within that information access?

MR. PITTERLE: My distinction is that information access is data type traffic, information service providers; and information services is more the time and temperature type service, which is separate.

MR. HARRINGTON: I'm going to read to you the definition of information service from the Communications Act. It will take me a moment to 16 find it. This is for reference Section 320 of the Communications Act. The term--I will bring it over to you so you could read it in a moment. information service means the offering of a 20 capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via

1 telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service. 6 And it's coming over to you right now. MR. OATES: Could you give us the cite 7 again. 8 MR. HARRINGTON: 9 Section 3 of the Communications Act, 320. That would be 47 USC 153 11 | (20).12 And the copy that's being brought over to 13∥you is marked with a pink tab. There are other tabs in the book that are not relevant. 15 Let me know when you have finished reading 16 it. 17 (Pause.) MR. PITTERLE: I finished. 1.8

MR. HARRINGTON: Is that definition

20 limited to Internet Service Providers?

21 MR. PITTERLE: It does not state "Internet

22|Service Providers," no.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Would voicemail fall 1 2 within that service definition?

MR. PITTERLE: I wouldn't be certain, based on these types of words. Certainly the 5 possibility exists, yes.

MR. HARRINGTON: Would a service offered by a newspaper where you can call and get sports scores fall within this definition?

MR. OATES: I object. I think the witness testified he's not comfortable with interpreting this provision of the Act. It's calling for a 12 | legal opinion anyway.

MR. HARRINGTON: If the witness is willing to say he's not competent to figure out what is an information service, I will stop here.

MR. PITTERLE: I'm not that familiar with information services, so I would say that that would be a great idea.

MR. HARRINGTON: I will stop here on that, then. I'm sorry, not on everything, however.

You also testified during your earlier 22 cross-examination that the phrase "customer ISP"

which was used in the definition of measured

Internet traffic, you felt that the term "cut ISP"

was, in fact, the only term that mattered that any

customer under that provision would be also an ISP?

This is referring to traffic that terminated a

customer ISP. If you would like to look at

definition again, please feel free.

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MR. PITTERLE: That definition is where again?

MR. HARRINGTON: It's your definition of measured Internet traffic, which is, I believe, the same for all the parties. If you want to look at it in the Cox language, it will be somewhere around page 30. I'm sorry, it will be earlier.

MS. PREISS: Page 32 of the JDPL? 42, I'm 16∥sorry.

> MR. HARRINGTON: 42.

MR. DYGERT: How much more do you think 19 you have for this witness?

20 MR. HARRINGTON: If we are just

restricting it to I-5, I will have one other topic 21 after this, which I hope will not take too long.

MR. DYGERT: Should we plan on getting

2 through that before lunch?

MR. HARRINGTON: I think so.

MR. PITTERLE: I'm looking at the Cox

5 language?

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MR. HARRINGTON: Cox language.

MR. PITTERLE: I can't find it under that

8 page number.

9 MR. HARRINGTON: I believe it's 1.41(A).

10 \parallel I will read it to you, in relevant part.

11 (Reading) Measured Internet traffic means

12 dialup switched Internet traffic originated by a

13∥customer of one party on that party's network at a

14 point in a Verizon local calling area and delivered

15 to a customer or an Internet Service Provider

16 served by the other party on that other party's

17 network at a point in the same Verizon local

18 calling area.

I would like you to focus on the phrase

20 | "delivered to a customer or Internet Service

21 Provider."

22 MR. PITTERLE: I have. I was asked that

1 question previously, and my answer was that I view 2 those as one and the same.

MR. HARRINGTON: So, you would you object to removing the phrase "customer or" from that 5 | language, then?

MR. PITTERLE: At this point I'm not opposed to it, to that concept.

> MR. HARRINGTON: Okay.

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I would like to move on to the change-of-law provision issue.

MR. PITTERLE: If I could on that answer, 12 though, state that -- that is part of what I would 13 determine to be negotiations that we--I said we 14 were willing to do. I would cast it in that light.

MR. HARRINGTON: You're not the negotiator 16 with Cox on this issue, are you?

MR. PITTERLE: No, I'm not, but I have the 18 negotiator for Cox that works for me.

MR. HARRINGTON: Let's move on to the change-of-law provision.

In Verizon Exhibit 19, which is your rebuttal testimony a,t the bottom of page eight--

MR. PITTERLE: Rebuttal testimony?

MR. HARRINGTON: Yes. The pages are not

numbered on my copy.

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MR. PITTERLE: Bottom of page eight?

MR. HARRINGTON: Yes.

MR. PITTERLE: The last question?

MR. HARRINGTON: Right. You describe

Verizon's objections to WorldCom's change-of-law

9 provision. Do you find that?

MR. PITTERLE: Yes.

11 MR. HARRINGTON: I believe it's the next

12 page of your testimony, but you say that Verizon

13 has the same objections generally to Cox's language

 $4\,\|$ as it does to AT&T's and WorldCom's.

Do you have the same objections to Cox's

16 change-of-law provision that you have to

17 WorldCom's?

18 MR. PITTERLE: I would need to reference

19 back to the Cox change-of-law language, if I could.

MR. HARRINGTON: JDPL, page 36 in mine.

21 It's the language entitled "Scope" on that page.

22 It begins, "Upon the occurrence of any one of the

following conditions."

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It's hard to--

2 MR. PITTERLE: I have it.

3 MR. HARRINGTON: Are your objections to that language the same as your objections to WorldCom's?

6 MR. OATES: What is the cite to the 7 language? I'm sorry.

MR. HARRINGTON: Section 5.7.7.1.C.

MR. OATES: Thank you.

MR. PITTERLE: I'm going to go to a more flowing Cox language which you submitted on the 18th.

13 MR. HARRINGTON: The language is going to be the same.

15 MR. PITTERLE: But this was chopped up.

MR. HARRINGTON: That's fine. Just let me know when you had a chance to review it so you could tell me.

MR. PITTERLE: Okay.

It looks primarily this section is a 22 reservation-of-rights section by Cox.

MR. HARRINGTON: Really for both parties.

MR. PITTERLE: Okay.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Does that mean your objections are the same as or in some way different from your objections to WorldCom's language?

MR. PITTERLE: This looks like this language is somewhat different than the other parties', and I wouldn't say outright we have no problem with it. It's--it looks to be different, 10 and looks to be a little bit more balanced.

MR. HARRINGTON: Now, given the history of 12 this issue, generally, don't you think it's prudent 13 to have a specific change-of-law provision 14 governing it?

MR. PITTERLE: I think it's somewhat of a 16 | legal question when we get into the change of law 17 and what change-of-law provisions are needed or not 18 needed.

I would state that the -- there is another 20 section that I believe in this overall contract 21 proposal that has change-of-law language in it 22 that's more boilerplate.

1 MR. HARRINGTON: Let's look at that |section. You should have it in front of you. Section 27.3 in the materials that were handed out a little while ago.

And again, the regular text represents \parallel agreed-to language between the parties, although this is taken from the Cox version of the agreement.

Now, as you interpret this provision as 10 | Verizon interprets this provision, would it allow Cox to renegotiate the provisions governing 12 ISP-bound traffic if the Court of Appeals overturned the April 27th order? 13 |

MR. PITTERLE: I haven't had a chance to read it. Should I be reading 27-3 and 27-4, both?

> MR. HARRINGTON: I believe it's just 27-3.

MR. PITTERLE: Thank you.

(Pause.)

Okay. I read it. Now--MR. PITTERLE:

I will ask the question MR. HARRINGTON:

again. You're not likely to remember it after a 21

22 while.

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MR. PITTERLE: I can lose it.

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MR. HARRINGTON: As you interpret this provision, as Verizon interprets this, would it allow Cox to renegotiate the provisions governing ISP-bound traffic if the Court of Appeals overturned the April 27th order?

MR. PITTERLE: I would interpret it to mean that--and this is--I'm not an attorney, so I think an interpretation is nonlegal, but it would seem that applicable law is the key here. And if the order has an effective date, some subsequent reversal order, I think--I assume you're referring to, that effective date would be, under applicable law, would take place. It would be the effective date of any change, but then the parties would have certain amount of time to make the change in an amendment form to a contract to put that language into the contract.

MR. HARRINGTON: Let's assume for the moment, without your agreeing to this or your counsel agreeing to it, that the April 27th order constitutes applicable law. If it were overturned,

1 would the renegotiation provision of this section be triggered, in Verizon's view?

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MR. PITTERLE: I think in the testimony, and as I stated, that if there is a change in law, there is a reversal or a court decision or some 6∥other, I don't know what else, remand that would occur that would change the terms of the FCC order, under that order Verizon is willing to apply it 9∥under the applicable law which would be the terms 10 of that order.

Some of the other petitioners have talked about an automatic retroactive true-up to the 13 effective date of the contract or the order of the 14 FCC, and that certainly--if the order stated that, then that would be applicable law. But if the 16∥order did not state that, that goes beyond applicable law.

MR. HARRINGTON: That language is not in the Cox change-of-law provision?

MR. PITTERLE: It is not.

MR. HARRINGTON: In light of what you just 22 said, would you be comfortable with an order in